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Summary 
The recently adopted EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions is aimed at facilitating and 
boosting private competition law enforcement. As such, the Directive incorporates different 
measures that aim to remove the main obstacles that claimants face when bringing actions to 
courts. The Directive also tries to strike the balance between private and public enforcement and 
thus, consists of measures that protect the efficient public enforcement through leniency programs.  
The core of this thesis analyzes the issues regarding the passing-on defence, indirect purchaser 
standing and their possibilities to get compensated using a collective redress mechanism. It is 
oftentimes the case that direct purchaser passes on the overcharge of a cartelized product further 
down the supply chain. Thus, the ones that are actually being harmed by an unlawful conduct are 
indirect purchasers and ultimately the end users. Consequently, the Directive provides for the 
passing-on defence – a defence an infringer can invoke before the court arguing that the claimant 
did not suffer any harm as it has passed on the overcharge to its customers. Further, as indirect 
purchasers are oftentimes incapable of proving their loss, the Directive stipulates a rebuttable 
presumption in favour of indirect purchasers. Unfortunately, the EU has not come forward with 
any binding nor attractive collective redress mechanism that indirect purchasers could benefit 
from.   
This thesis argues that the solution proposed regarding the passing-on defence is not satisfying the 
main aim of the Directive, facilitating private competition law enforcement, and is largely based 
on a misconception that granting the passing-on defence is the only way to be compatible with the 
EU legal culture and traditions. This thesis also argues that the presumption in favour of indirect 
purchasers does facilitate the burden on indirect purchasers, but it would be of little help in real 
life as indirect purchasers would still face considerable obstacles when bringing damages actions, 
such as proving the causal link and their individual harm for example. Further, this thesis suggests 
that in addition to limiting the passing-on defence and granting indirect purchasers the widest 
possible standing, indirect purchasers should also be able to rely on an opt-out collective redress 
mechanism. 
Ultimately, this thesis argues that the EU should choose full compensation over 
undercompensation. It is herein admitted that there may be some minimal risk as for 
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overcompensation, but that this appears to be highly unlikely in the EU and that the risk of 
overcompensation is offset by the risk of undercompensation. 
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Abbreviations 
Commission – The European Commission 
Directive – Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 November 
2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union 
ECJ – The European Court of Justice  
EU – The European Union 
NCA – National Competition Authority 
TFEU – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
U.S – The United States of America  
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1. Introduction  
In 2008, the EU Commission came out with its analysis on the impact of infringements of 
competition rules in the EU. According to its data, violations of Article 101 and 102 TFEU 
(prohibition of agreements and practices that distort competition and prohibition of abuse of 
dominance respectively) have an immense negative effect on the internal market, competition itself 
and the victims of infringements. The Commission’s Impact Assessment accompanying the White 
Paper1 brought out: 
“The total annual cost for hardcore cartels in the EU can be estimated to range from approximately 
€25 billion (on the most conservative assumptions) to approximately €69 billion (on the least 
conservative). Expressed as a proportion of the EU’s gross domestic product, the negative 
consumer welfare impact of all these hardcore cartels is estimated as ranging from 0.23% to 0.62% 
of the EU’s GDP in 2007, which does not include the harm caused by abusive practices and 
infringements of Article 812 other than hardcore cartels. To illustrate the harm created by cartels 
and thus the potential benefits of enhanced private enforcement differently: if more effective 
compensation mechanisms were to lead to a reduction of hardcore cartels by, for example, 5%, the 
negative consumer welfare impact would be reduced by €1.25 to €3.45 billion”.3  
The above-quoted document and the Commission’s actions in general regarding EU private 
competition law enforcement were largely influenced by an extensive study4 (the Ashurst study) 
of private competition law enforcement in the Member States. The (in)famous first sentence of the 
Ashurst study states that “The picture that emerges from the present study on damages actions for 
breach of competition law in the enlarged EU is one of astonishing diversity and total 
underdevelopment”.5 This study was published more than ten years ago, in 2004. 
                                                 
1 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 2008, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0165&from=EN 
2 As for clarification, former Articles 81 and 82 refer to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU respectively.  
3 Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying document to the White Paper on Damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, Impact Assessment, 2008, p 14-15, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008SC0404&from=EN  
4 Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of 
infringement of EC competition rules, Ashurst study, 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf  
5 Ibid, p 1  
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Regardless of the fact that according to the latest studies there are more claiming and payments of 
compensation for the competition law infringements in damages actions,6 the harm to society 
remains immense. Also, irrespective of the fact that in some Member States of the EU, such as the 
UK, private litigation of competition law damages claims is quite developed, in many Member 
States, such as Estonia for example, bringing competition law damages claims is almost non-
existent.7  
Thus, in order to avoid forum-shopping, make the internal market of the EU more competitive, 
compensate the ones who have suffered harm caused by a competition law infringement and 
complement EU public competition law enforcement, a Directive8 that seeks to facilitate 
competition law damages actions was introduced in November 2013.   
The aim of the Directive is to compensate all victims that have suffered harm due to a competition 
law infringement. In order to do so, it establishes ways to remove practical obstacles that many 
victims face when bringing damages claims to court. In addition to that, it aims to balance the 
interaction between private and public competition law enforcement, so that one would not 
jeopardize the other and both could effectively co-exist.  
In a broad sense, the Directive introduces the following measures: 
 facilitating the access to evidence, however, claimants will need to be able to sufficiently 
describe the evidence and the courts will need to make sure that the disclosure is 
proportionate (Articles 5-7);   
 a final decision of a national competition authority will prove before the court of the same 
Member State that the infringement occurred, a final decision of a NCA will constitute at 
least prima facie evidence before another Member State court (Article 9); 
                                                 
6 Barry Rodger, Competition Law Comparative Enforcement and Collective Redress across the EU, Wolters 
Kluwer, 2014, p 258 
7 Project ”Comparative Private Enforcement and Consumer Redress in the EU”, led by Professor Barry Rodger, 
Comparative competition law private enforcement and consumer redress in the EU 1999-2009, National Report of 
Estonia by Dr. Karin Sein, p 1, available at http://www.clcpecreu.co.uk/pdf/final/Estonia-
%20Executive%20Summary.pdf  
8 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules 
governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the 
Member States and of the European Union, O.J. 2014, L 349/1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0104&from=EN  
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 victims will have at least five years to bring damages actions so that they would have 
sufficient time to bring actions (Article 10); 
 an infringer can invoke the passing-on defence and there is a rebuttable presumption that 
indirect purchasers suffered some level of overcharge harm (Articles 12-14); 
 victims are entitled to full compensation that includes both actual loss and loss of profit 
plus interests (Article 3); 
 there is a rebuttable presumption that cartels do cause harm (Article 17); 
 the Directive establishes joint and several liability, so that any infringer is liable for the 
whole harm caused (Article 11).9 
The core of this thesis is regarding the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing. It is 
oftentimes the case that direct purchasers pass on some of the overcharge caused by a cartel to 
their customers further down the supply chain.10 Accordingly, an infringer should be able to reduce 
the compensation paid to direct purchasers by the amount the overcharge was passed on to indirect 
purchasers. Consequently, indirect purchasers should be able to claim compensation for the 
amount the overcharge was passed on to them. However, as indirect purchasers are not in the best 
position to bring damages actions as they are often relatively small and distant from the 
infringement, some sort of incentive should be present to make sure that any individual could claim 
damages for competition law infringements.  
Essentially, this thesis will analyze whether the solutions proposed by the Directive regarding the 
passing-on of overcharges will be compatible with one of the main objectives of the Directive – to 
facilitate private competition law enforcement. In addition to that, the aim of the thesis is also to 
analyze whether the solutions proposed in the Directive regarding the passing-on of overcharges 
were based on legitimate arguments. Also, it will be analyzed whether the current collective redress 
mechanism is effective and whether indirect purchasers could benefit from a more attractive 
redress mechanism. Ultimately, the thesis will answer whether the impact of the passing-on 
defence and indirect purchaser standing should be reconsidered. 
                                                 
9 DG Competition website, Actions for Damages, Directive on Antitrust Damages, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/directive_en.html  
10 David Ashton and David Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU, Edward Elgar publishing, 2013, p 37 
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The thesis will touch upon the concepts of the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing 
which together form the concept of the passing-on of overcharges (section 2). It will first study the 
experience of the U.S. in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. The U.S. antitrust system is known to 
be the most ”mature regime” in the field of competition law.11 Thus, examining the U.S. experience 
is vital as their competition law private litigation can give a very useful insight into how things 
should be done in the EU. 
Next it will explore the history and rationale of passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing 
in the EU (section 3). After developing an understanding of the passing-on of overcharges concept, 
the thesis will continue analyzing the core part of this research – the options and solutions proposed 
within the process of drafting of the Directive and eventually the final provisions of the Directive 
and the arguments they are founded upon (section 4). 
In the last chapter, this thesis will analyze how likely the overcompensation and unjust enrichment 
by direct and indirect purchasers is in case the passing-on defence is limited and indirect purchaser 
standing widened. It will also analyze which would be the best collective redress mechanism that 
indirect purchasers could benefit from in order to ensure a full compensation of any victim (section 
5). The analysis is conducted in two ways. First, it will be examined whether in light of the U.S. 
experience, overcompensation in the EU would be likely. Second, it will examine whether the 
collective redress mechanism available under EU law would make overcompensation and unjust 
enrichment by the direct and indirect purchasers likely and whether the EU should introduce a 
more attractive collective redress mechanism.  
  
                                                 
11 Ibid, p 1 
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2. Passing-on of overcharges concept  
In order to scrutinize the passing-on of overcharges provisions in the Directive, it is essential to 
get an overall understanding of the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing concepts. 
To do so, the U.S. experience and the European approach to these concepts are being studied. As 
a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the passing-on of overcharges within this thesis 
shall comprise of the notion of the passing-on defence as well as the passing-on offence, i.e. 
indirect purchasers’ standing. Thus, this thesis will cover the concept of the passing-on of 
overcharges from the perspective of the defendant (passing-on defence) and from the perspective 
of the indirect purchaser standing (passing-on offence).12   
2.1. Overview in the U.S. 
Private competition law enforcement has been evolving in the U.S. since the coming into force of 
the Sherman Act in 1890. More precisely, § 4 of the Clayton Act provides for damages actions and 
refers to the infringements of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Given the development of the U.S. 
in the field of competition law is greater compared to the rest of the world,13 it is only appropriate 
to study its experience and take it into account when talking about the EU private competition law 
enforcement. However, it is nevertheless important to understand that there exist some material 
differences between those two legal cultures and that not everything can easily be compared.  
For instance, the U.S. antitrust system provides for treble damages that serve the deterrent purpose 
as the government resources are oftentimes limited.14 The EU, however, emphasizes the need to 
“preserve strong public enforcement” and highlights that the guiding principle in the EU antitrust 
system is the full compensation of the victims. Albeit, it nevertheless notes that an effective private 
competition law enforcement inherently serves the deterrent purpose as well.15 Thus, broadly 
speaking, the U.S. system relies heavily on private enforcement compared to the EU where private 
                                                 
12 Also, as for clarification, the terms “antitrust” and “competition” are used interchangeably. 
13 Ibid, p 1 
14 Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association 
in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European Communities On Damages 
Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules, April 2006, p 27, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/aba.pdf  
15 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 2008, p 3 
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enforcement is seen, and perhaps too strictly perceived, as a complementary mechanism next to 
public enforcement.    
Advancing from an overall U.S. antitrust background to the core subject of this thesis, the passing-
on defence and indirect purchaser standing have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
judgments Hanover Shoe, Inc v United Shoe Machinery, Corp16 and Illinois Brick Co v Illinois17 
respectively.  
2.1.1. Hanover Shoe 
The Hanover Shoe case concerned a manufacturer of shoes (Hanover) and a manufacturer and 
distributor of shoe machinery (United). Hanover claimed first that United had monopolized the 
shoe machinery industry which was against the law, and second that the practice of leasing the 
shoe machinery and refusal of selling it had also been unlawful. Thus, Hanover claimed it should 
be entitled to the price difference it had paid more due to the fact that it could not buy the machinery 
but had to lease it during the relevant period.18 As for the defence, United claimed that Hanover 
had not suffered any loss as it had passed on the overcharge to its customers.19  
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the infringer of competition law cannot escape liability by 
claiming that the direct purchaser did not suffer any damage as it passed on an overcharge to its 
own customers. The Supreme Court brought out three main policy arguments in order to support 
its judgment and prohibit the passing-on defence:  
 the economic analysis and calculating the passing-on “would normally prove 
insurmountable”;20  
 allowing the passing-on defence would ultimately lead to fewer direct purchasers to claim 
damages as it complicates the claim; and  
                                                 
16 [1968] 392 U.S. 481 
17 [1977] 431 U.S. 720 
18 [1968] 392 U.S 481, p 483-484  
19 Ibid, p 488 
20 Ibid, p 493 
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 allowing the passing-on defence would amount to the unjust enrichment of infringers as 
the number of damages claims would decrease.21  
2.1.2. Illinois Brick 
The Illinois Brick case concerned the State of Illinois and 700 local governmental entities 
(Respondents) and concrete block manufacturers (Defendants). The Respondents sold the goods 
to masonry contractors, which in turn sold the goods to general contractors, from which 
Respondents as indirect purchasers purchased the concrete block in the form of masonry structures. 
The Respondents claimed that the Defendants had been involved in an unlawful price-fixing 
conspiracy. The Defendants argued that only direct purchasers could sue for the alleged 
overcharge.22 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that if the Hanover Shoe case prohibited the using of the passing-on 
defence, then the law should also prohibit the use of the passing-on offense by indirect purchasers. 
The Supreme Court brought out the following: 
 allowing offensive use of passing-on without giving the other party a chance of using it 
defensively “would create a serious risk of multiple liability for defendants”;  
 the uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing the overcharge between different levels of 
distribution chain would further complicate the claims;  
 the deterrence objective would be best served when only direct purchasers can bring 
actions; and  
 that allowing the offensive use of passing-on would be inconsistent with the Hanover 
Shoe.23    
However, it is interesting to note that contrary to the Hanover Shoe case where no dissent was 
made regarding the prohibition of the passing-on defence, the dissenting opinion in Illinois Brick 
by Mr. Justice Brennan claims that “the unavailability of a pass-on theory to a defendant should 
not necessarily preclude its use by plaintiffs seeking treble damages against that defendant”.24  
                                                 
21 Ibid, p 494 
22 [1977] 431 U.S. 720, p 726-727 
23 Ibid, p 731-732, 736 
24 Ibid, p 729-730 
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Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that “There are sound reasons for treating offensive and defensive 
passing-on cases differently”. He explained: 
“There is no danger in this case, for example, as there was in Hanover Shoe, that the defendant 
will escape liability and frustrate the objectives of the treble-damages action. Rather, the same 
policies of insuring the continued effectiveness of the treble-damages action and preventing 
wrongdoers from retaining the spoils of their misdeeds favor allowing indirect purchasers to prove 
that overcharges were passed on to them. Hanover Shoe thus can and should be limited to cases of 
defensive assertion of the passing-on defense to antitrust liability, where direct and indirect 
purchasers are not parties in the same action.”25  
In addition, Mr. Justice Blackmun complemented the dissenting opinion by arguing: 
“The Court feels that it must be ‘consistent’ in its application of pass-on. That, for me, is a wooden 
approach, and it is entirely inadequate when considered in the light of the objectives of the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts”.26 
2.1.3. Post Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick 
It seems that the majority approves the prohibition of passing-on defence established in the 
Hanover Shoe. However, there has been constant criticism following the prohibition of indirect 
purchaser standing in Illinois Brick. This led to many states to enact statutes that would allow 
indirect purchaser standing which, in turn, raised a question as to the legitimacy of those statutes.  
Consequently, the U.S. Supreme Court held in California v Arc America Corp that “Illinois Brick 
was a decision construing the federal antitrust laws, not a decision defining the interrelationship 
between the federal and state antitrust laws. The congressional purposes on which Illinois Brick 
was based provide no support for a finding that state indirect purchaser statutes are pre-empted by 
federal law”.27  
Subsequently, this led to even more states enacting laws allowing indirect purchaser standing. 
Today, approximately two-thirds of the U.S. states provide for indirect purchaser standing at the 
                                                 
25 Ibid, Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting 
26 Ibid, Mr. Justice Blackmun, dissenting 
27 [1989] 490 U.S. 93, p 105-106 
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state level. It ultimately results in a system where most of the direct purchasers file their damages 
claims in federal courts. However, most indirect purchasers file their damages claims in state 
courts.28 Thus, indirect purchasers can recover damages even if direct purchasers recovered for the 
same overcharge at the federal level in parallel proceedings. Such system of uncoordinated 
litigation has been condemned by some stakeholders as it may result in legal uncertainty and 
duplicative damages awards.29  
In order to remedy the aforementioned issue, the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section 
published an interesting report which aimed at balancing the interests of the stakeholders 
recognized by the Supreme Court.30 The report is suggesting an option that would maximize 
deterrence and provide compensation while at the same time it would avoid inconsistent results 
and duplicative recoveries. The report is supposed to stand for a “compromise proposal without 
endorsing one side or the other.”31 The report suggests that indirect purchasers would be entitled 
to claim damages under federal law, thus overturning Illinois Brick.32 The passing-on defence 
would nevertheless remain prohibited, thus Hanover Shoe would not be overturned.  
However, others argue that according to the statistics, the amount of damages actions brought by 
direct purchasers has been showing a sharp increase, compared to the damages claims brought by 
indirect purchasers that has not been showing almost any variation. Consequently, the effect of the 
damages claims brought by indirect purchasers in the U.S. tend to have a minimal effect to the 
private antitrust litigation. Thus, the data studied is suggesting that the Illinois Brick repealer 
statutes play a very small role in compensating victims and that the so-called free riding by indirect 
purchasers is minimal.33  
                                                 
28 Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association 
in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European Communities On Damage 
Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules, April 2006, p 38-30 
29 Ibid, p 32 
30 American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Report on Remedies, 2004, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/antitrust_law/report_remediesreportcouncil.authcheckd
am.pdf  
31 Ibid, p 2 
32 Ibid, p 3 
33 Andrew S. Gehring, The power of the purchaser: the effect on indirect purchaser damages suits on deterring 
antitrust violations, New York University Journal of Law & Liberty, 2010, p 245-246, available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/ECM_PRO_065898.pdf  
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To conclude, indirect purchaser standing and to some extent also the passing-on defence remain a 
passionately debated subject in the antitrust community in the U.S. The status quo is that both the 
passing-on defence and offence are prohibited at the federal level. As indirect purchaser standing 
is not prohibited at the state level, it inevitably results in practical issues such as contradictory 
judgments for example. However, it seems to the author that there is a misconception regarding 
the dynamics between the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing. Namely, as has 
been persuasively brought out by the dissenting judges in Illinois Brick and the American Bar 
Association Antirust Section, prohibiting the passing-on defence does not automatically mean that 
indirect purchaser standing should be prohibited. On the contrary, there are sound legal and 
economic arguments that could allow the prohibition of passing-on defence and permitting of 
indirect purchaser standing to co-exist.    
2.2. Overview in the EU 
The passing-on of overcharges regarding the passing-on defence has not been strictly decided by 
the European Court of Justice and remains a debated topic within the EU. However, the ECJ has 
conclusively ruled in the milestone cases of Courage,34 Manfredi,35 Pfleiderer36 and Kone37 that 
any individual can claim damages for the loss caused to them. Thus, it can be said that compared 
to the U.S. system where the passing-on defence was first decided in Hanover Shoe which led to 
the decision not to allow indirect purchaser standing in Illinois Brick, the EU has decided to first 
settle the issue regarding indirect purchaser standing.  
2.2.1.  The passing-on defence in the EU 
The passing-on defence in the EU has not yet been decided in competition law cases. However, 
the ECJ has on several occasion touched upon that issue in other fields. The ECJ has brought out 
the following:  
“As that exception is a restriction on a subjective right derived from Community legal order, it 
must be interpreted restrictively, taking account in particular of the fact that passing on a charge 
                                                 
34 Courage and Crehan, C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, para 26 
35 Manfredi, C-295/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, para 60 
36 Pfleiderer, C-360/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:389, para 28 
37 Kone and Others, C-557/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1317, para 33 
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to the consumer does not necessarily neutralize the economic effects of the tax on the taxable 
person”.38  
Further, the Advocate General Tesauro has stated: 
“I do not in fact believe it can be right to describe as unjust enrichment the profit derived by an 
individual from the reimbursement of a charge unduly required and levied by the authorities. More 
especially, I do not believe that the State, which itself has actually obtained unjust enrichment by 
levying – for years, even – an unlawful charge, may then specifically rely on a principle of that 
kind to refuse to repay the sums unduly paid.”39  
The passing-on defence in tax law cases can be easily compared to the passing-on defence cases 
in competition law cases. “There is no reason to protect the perpetrator of a serious competition 
law violation who has for some time enjoyed anti-competitive gains, to the detriment of the victim 
of the anti-competitive practice, just because the surcharge may have been passed on.”40  
In addition, in the Hans Just41 case, the ECJ analyzed the importance of taking into account the 
loss of profit due to the unlawfully levied tax. It stated:  
“There is nothing therefore, from the point of view of Community law, to prevent national courts 
from taking account in accordance with their national law of the fact that it has been possible for 
charges unduly levied to be incorporated in the prices of the undertaking liable for the charge and 
to be passed on to the purchasers. It is equally compatible with the principles of Community law 
for courts before which claims for recovery of repayments are brought to take into consideration, 
in accordance with their national law, the damage which an importer may have suffered because 
the effect of the discriminatory or protective tax provisions was to restrict the volume of imports 
from other Member States.”42 
                                                 
38 Weber's Wine World and Others, C-147/01, ECLI:EU:C:2003:533, para 95 
39 Comateb and Others, C-192/95, ECLI:EU:C:1996:258, para 21 
40 Assimakis P Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement, Hart Publishing, 2008, p 200-201 
41 Hans Just I/S v Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, C-68/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:57 
42 Ibid, para 26 
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However, in Courage and Crehan, the ECJ has stated that “the Court has held that Community 
law does not prevent national courts from taking steps to ensure that the protection of the rights 
guaranteed by Community law does not entail the unjust enrichment of those who enjoy them”.43  
Further, it is interesting to note that there are situations where the defendant’s burden to 
demonstrate the existence and extent of the passing-on of overcharges would be impossible to 
surpass. This would be the case for the burden of proof established in San Giorgio,44 where the 
ECJ held that a national provision that required to put the burden of proof on the claimant to 
demonstrate that it was not possible to the claimant to pass on the overcharge to the end-consumers, 
would be incompatible with the EU law as it would make it excessively difficult to the claimant to 
secure compensation. Thus, it might be the case that the burden of proof shifts from the defendant 
to the claimant as the defendant has showed to some extent that the overcharge was passed on. It 
would then be the claimant’s turn to present some contradictory evidence. However, as according 
to the San Giorgio case it is not obliged to do so, the passing on defence would be “nugatory in 
practice”.45    
Thus, based on the abovementioned case law, regardless of the fact that the ECJ in theory permits  
mechanisms such as the passing-on defence, it is nevertheless not widely accepted under the EU 
law and should not have a broad interpretation. 
2.2.2. Indirect Purchaser Standing in the EU 
Indirect purchaser standing has been repeatedly affirmed by the ECJ. In Courage and Crehan, the 
ECJ stated: 
“The full effectiveness of Article 85 of the Treaty and, in particular, the practical effect of the 
prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to 
claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort 
competition”.46  
                                                 
43 Courage and Crehan, C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, para 30 
44 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v SpA San Giorgio, C-199/82, ECLI:EU:C:1983:318 
45 David Ashton and David Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU, Elgar Competition Law and Practice, 
2013, p 53 
46 Courage and Crehan, C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, para 26 
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In addition, the ECJ has also decided the “umbrella pricing” issue in Kone and Others and went 
even further to specify: 
“The full effectiveness of Article 101 TFEU would be put at risk if the right of any individual to 
claim compensation for harm suffered were subjected by national law, categorically and regardless 
of the particular circumstances of the case, to the existence of a direct causal link while excluding 
that right because the individual concerned had no contractual links with a member of the cartel, 
but with an undertaking not party thereto, whose pricing policy, however, is a result of the cartel 
that contributed to the distortion of price formation mechanisms governing competitive markets”.47  
Therefore, it can be stated that according to the settled case law, the ECJ has ensured an extensive 
standing for the competition law cases, expanding it even to the “umbrella pricing” cases. Granting 
the right to claim damages to any individual who has suffered harm caused by competition law 
infringement also goes in line with the overall compensatory principle prevailing in the EU private 
competition law enforcement. Moreover, as the TFEU is commonly referred to as a constitutional 
instrument which grants rights to its citizens,48 it is understandable why the ECJ does not want to 
limit the standing in cases of the infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. A broad standing, 
however, does not unfortunately constitute an incentive per se for indirect purchasers to bring 
claims as they oftentimes face numerous obstacles and legal uncertainty regarding the positive 
outcome of their case.   
3. Passing-on of overcharges in the Directive 
The following chapter will analyze the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing options 
and solutions beginning with the options set out in the Green Paper49 and ending with the solutions 
stipulated in the Directive. The chapter also argues that some arguments regarding the allowance 
of the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing are based on misconceptions.  
                                                 
47 Kone and Others, C-557/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:1317, para 33 
48 Opinion 1/91, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, para 21; and NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend 
& Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, C-26/62, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, p 12 
49 Green Paper, Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, Brussels, 2005, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0672&from=EN 
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3.1. Passing-on of overcharges options in the Green Paper 
The Green Paper suggested four options regarding the passing-on of overcharges issue:  
 The passing-on defence is allowed and both direct and indirect purchasers can sue the 
infringer (option 21); 
 The passing-on defence is excluded and only direct purchasers can sue the infringer 
(option 22); 
 The passing-on defence is excluded and both direct and indirect purchasers can sue the 
infringer (option 23); 
 A two-step procedure, in which the passing-on defence is excluded, the infringer can be 
sued by any victim and, in a second step, the overcharge is distributed between all the 
parties who have suffered a loss (option 24).50 
The Green Paper brought out in a rather simplistic way the main advantages and disadvantages of 
each option. As for the option 21, direct purchasers might not be able to recover damages as the 
infringer can use the passing-on defence and indirect purchasers might fail showing that the 
overcharge has been passed on to them. As for the option 22, direct purchasers will benefit from 
the fact that the infringer cannot invoke the passing-on defence. As for the option 23, the actions 
would be less burdensome for the claimant as the passing-on defence is prohibited, however, 
defendants might face the risk of paying multiple damages for both direct and indirect purchasers. 
As for the option 24, it would be technically difficult but could enhance fair compensation for all 
victims.51 
Following an intensive public discussion period, different stakeholders expressed their opinions 
regarding the possible solution to the passing-on of the overcharges issue. The comments were 
indeed very diverse. For example, there were stakeholders suggesting that the passing-on defence 
should be excluded and indirect purchaser standing granted in case direct purchaser do not bring 
claims;52 there were stakeholders suggesting that both direct and indirect purchasers should be 
                                                 
50 Ibid, p 8 
51 Ibid, p 8 
52 Comments of the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law On the DG 
Competition Green Paper of December 2005 on Damages actions for breach of the EC Antitrust rules, p 2, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/max_planck_institut.pdf  
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allowed to sue the infringer and that the passing-on defence should be allowed regardless of the 
fact that it may “constitute a significant disincentive” to the commencement of claims by direct 
purchasers.53 
Many conclusions regarding the passing-on of overcharges issue have been done under the 
impression that the primary objective of the damages claims in the EU is compensation and not 
imposing financial penalties.54 As such, the legal cultures are very different in the U.S. and in the 
EU: treble damages have long been available in the U.S., compared to the EU where granting 
double damages, let alone treble damages, is commonly not accepted.55 In fear of duplicative 
damages, many stakeholders wish to allow for the passing-on defence, arguing that the 
compensatory nature of the competition law private enforcement insists on making the passing-on 
defence available.  
However, the author finds that perhaps the concept of compensatory objective should have a 
broader definition. Indeed, as also brought out by the American Appellate judge Mr. F. 
Easterbrook, a way of thinking about multiple damages could also be as a means of compensating 
for infringements that will not be detected.56 In addition, possible double damages in case the 
passing-on defence is prohibited and indirect purchaser standing allowed does not exclude the 
compensatory objective of competition law private enforcement. On the contrary, it would only 
ensure that compensating the victims is present. Indeed, for example, let’s take a situation where 
a successful claimant can recover three times the compensatory damages compared to their actual 
damages. As such, the aims of both deterrence and compensation will ultimately be served.57 
                                                 
53 Submission to the European Commission in Response to its Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the 
EC Antitrust Rules, Submitted on behalf of the Competition Law Forum of the British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2006, p 15-16, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/clf.pdf  
54 For example, International Bar Association Antitrust Committee Working Group on Private Antitrust Litigation in 
Europe Submission Regarding the European Commission’s Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules, p 18, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/iba.pdf  
55 Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law and the Section of International Law of the American Bar Association 
in Response to the Request for Public Comment of the Commission of the European Communities On Damage 
Actions for Breaches of EU Antitrust Rules, 2006, p 65, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_green_paper_comments/aba.pdf  
56 F. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. Econ, 1985, p 445 
57 Zygimantas Juska, Obstacles in European Competition Law Enforcement: A Potential Solution from Collective 
Redress, European Journal of Legal Studies, vol 7 no 1, p 138, available at http://www.ejls.eu/15/184UK.htm  
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Also, it must be noted that the objectives of deterrence and compensation do not necessarily need 
to be incompatible with one another and can be overlapping in some cases.58 As such, the 
Commission itself has brought out that an effective private competition law enforcement 
inherently serves the deterrent objective as well.59 However when examining the views put forward 
by the Commission in the later stages, it can be learnt that deterrence as a policy aim “has dropped 
out completely, being replaced by “optimising” the relationship between public and private 
enforcement”.60 This is so most probably due to the fact that the objective of deterrence is most 
commonly associated with giving an exclusive standing to direct purchasers only.61 Yet, this does 
not necessarily have to be the case in the EU. 
Thus, it may be that many stakeholders and the Commission itself were in favour of allowing the 
passing-on defence on a slightly stiff presumption that allowing it would be the only way to be 
compatible with the EU legal culture and granting indirect purchaser standing. Though, the ECJ 
has stated that granting exemplary and punitive damages is not conflicting with the EU legal 
culture.62 As can also be seen from the previous paragraphs, the objectives of compensation and 
deterrence can effectively co-exist.      
3.2. Passing-on of overcharges solution in the White Paper  
The White Paper states that the solutions brought out in it “consist of balanced measures that are 
rooted in the European legal culture and traditions”. It adds that the private antitrust enforcement 
framework is based on “a genuine European approach”.63 What this “genuine European approach” 
is remains problematic and unexplained in the White Paper.  
                                                 
58 David Ashton and David Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU, Edward Elgar publishing, 2013, p 38 
59 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 2008, p 3  
60 David Ashton and David Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU, Edward Elgar publishing, 2013, p 130 
footnote 14 
61 Ibid, p 38 
62 Manfredi, C-295/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:461, para 99. However, double damages may conflict with the ne bis in 
idem principle. “The principle of ne bis in idem prohibits the same person from being sanctioned more than once for 
the same unlawful conduct in order to protect one and the same legal interest. The application of that principle is 
subject to three cumulative conditions: the identity of the facts, the unity of offender and the unity of legal interest.” 
Archer Daniels Midland v Commission, T-329/01, ECLI:EU:T:2006:268, para 290. It should be noted that as for the 
third condition, in order to establish the infringement of the principle, it should be affirmed that a possible fine and a 
possible double damages award serve the same interest, the deterrence interest.  
63 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 2008, p 3 
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According to the White Paper, there were two common arguments against the prohibition of the 
passing-on defence: first, it would lead to the unjust enrichment of direct purchasers who did not 
suffer harm as they passed on the overcharges; and second, the infringer would suffer from double 
damages in cases where both direct and indirect purchasers will recover damages for the same 
overcharge. However, the ones suggesting that the passing-on defence should be prohibited, 
claimed that the aforementioned theory is “purely theoretical” and contended that allowing the 
passing-on defence would serve as a disincentive for direct purchasers to bring claims. In addition, 
as indirect purchasers face difficulties in proving the infringement and how it relates to the damage, 
the passing-on defence could lead to a situation where no one is being compensated.64  
The White Paper concludes that “the defendant in an antitrust damages case should be entitled to 
rely on the passing-on defence against a claim for compensation of the overcharge, brought by a 
claimant who is not a final consumer;” and that indirect purchasers would be entitled to bring 
claims and “would be able to rely on the rebuttable presumption that the illegal overcharge was 
passed on in its entirety down to his level”.65   
3.3. Passing-on defence exception 
Before giving an overview of the passing-on of the overcharges chapter in the Directive, it would 
be very interesting to touch upon a caveat brought out in the final proposal of the Directive.66 
Namely, the proposed Directive stipulates that “Insofar as the overcharge has been passed on to 
persons at the next level of the supply chain for whom it is legally impossible to claim 
compensation for their harm, the defendant shall not be able to invoke the defence referred to in 
the preceding paragraph”.67  
The rationale behind this exception is that in some cases, indirect purchasers would face legal 
impossibility to prove the causal link between the infringement and the harm they suffered. As 
such, the Directive is not intended to regulate the rules on causality of the Member States. Indeed, 
                                                 
64 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, 2008, p 63 
65 Ibid, p 65-67 
66 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, 2013, available at http://eur-
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it has been argued that as a matter of procedural autonomy, the EU depends on its Member States 
as for the remedies and judicial protection of the rights granted by the EU. Consequently, it should 
be only fair that for example in the case of the Directive, the rules on causality will not be 
harmonized. However, it shall be noted that harmonizing certain conditions relating to the 
remedies in the private competition law enforcement under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU “need not 
be seen as a major legal revolution”. Harmonizing the remedies would only make clear the rights 
that must in any event arise from Article 101 and 102 TFEU. As such, harmonizing the rules on 
causality, for example, do not conflict with the principle of the autonomy of Member States in 
matters of remedies and procedure.68 Also, the fulfilment of the conditions regarding causation 
“play a predominant role in regulating the damages claims” in competition law due to for instance 
complex market structures.69 Thus, the rules governing causality should have been harmonized as 
well.   
As a result of not harmonizing the rules on causality, it might be the case that in some Member 
States, the rules on causality (for example the rules on remoteness and foreseeability) would 
deprive the indirect purchaser of recovery. Thus, the exception makes sense and is perfectly fair. 
However, this exception would fundamentally conflict with the settled case law of the ECJ – the 
ECJ has consistently held that any individual can claim damages for the harm it has suffered.70 
Depriving a priori someone from the standing would not be consistent with what has been decided 
and accepted on the EU level.       
Probably as a result of realizing that the concept of such exception would indeed be very much in 
conflict with the acquis, the exception has simply been erased from the Directive. It must be noted 
that the rules on the causality will still rest in the domain of national law of the Member States. It 
is highly unlikely, though, that a simple eradication of a provision would also exclude the actual 
risk of having “persons at the next level of the supply chain for whom it is legally impossible to 
claim compensation for their harm”. Also, if an indirect purchaser fails to bring an action due to 
the causality requirements, an infringer would nevertheless be able to invoke the passing-on 
                                                 
68 David Ashton and David Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU, Edward Elgar publishing, 2013, p 11, 
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69 Ioannis Lianos, Causal Uncertainty and Damages Claims for the Infringement of Competition Law in Europe, 
CLES Research Paper Series 2/2015, p 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2564329  
70 For example, Courage and Crehan, C-453/99, ECLI:EU:C:2001:465, para 26 
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defence. As such, deleting this exception is even more harmful to the efficient private competition 
law enforcement as it makes the use of the passing-on defence more disposable and without 
restrictions.    
3.4. Overview of the relevant provisions in the Directive 
The Directive acknowledges a wide concept of both indirect purchaser standing and the passing-
on defence. 
It codifies both in several recitals and Article 3 a wide concept for standing: 
“The right to compensation is recognised for any natural or legal person – consumers, undertakings 
and public authorities alike – irrespective of the existence of a direct contractual relationship with 
the infringing undertaking, and regardless of whether or not there has been a prior finding of an 
infringement by a competition authority.” 
Thus, indirect purchaser standing shall certainly be covered by that broad definition.   
Article 13 provides for the passing-on defence and stipulates: 
“Member States shall ensure that the defendant in an action for damages can invoke as a defence 
against a claim for damages the fact that the claimant passed on the whole or part of the overcharge 
resulting from the infringement of competition law. The burden of proving that the overcharge was 
passed on shall be on the defendant, who may reasonably require disclosure from the claimant or 
from third parties.” 
It is interesting to note that the general fear of overcompensation mirrors back from the Directive. 
For example, it has been written in Article 12(2) that “To avoid overcompensation, Member States 
shall lay down procedural rules appropriate to ensure that compensation for actual loss at any level 
of the supply chain does not exceed the overcharge harm suffered at that level.” One may argue, 
on the other side, that the Directive seeks to strike the balance between overcompensation and 
undercompensation, saying that the Directive, for example in its recital 4, also requires each 
Member State to ensure the effective exercise for the right to compensation. However, as the 
Directive does not mention the concept of undercompensation, and specifically entails the concept 
of overcompensation, it is rather clear that the EU is more afraid of overcompensation rather than 
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undercompensation. Also, on a purely ethical and moral viewpoint, the fact that the infringers are 
favored to the victims as a result of enacting provisions that explicitly aim to prevent 
overcompensation and not enacting provision that explicitly aim to prevent undercompensation, is 
rather unfair.  
As for indirect purchasers and their burden of proof it has been argued that “because the scenario 
according to which the defendant is unjustly enriched is more likely than the one where he would 
face multiple liability, the Commission considers it appropriate to ease the claimant’s burden of 
proving the passing-on and its extent”71.  
Therefore, the Directive stipulates in Article 14 that the burden of proving the existence and scope 
of the passing-on of overcharge to the claimant shall rest with the claimant and stipulates a 
presumption in favour of claimants. It is oftentimes the case that the ones not in direct contact with 
the infringer find it, for example due to the information asymmetry, especially difficult to bring 
sufficient evidence in court. However, if the overcharge has been passed on to indirect purchasers, 
then they are the ones who are actually suffering the harm. In order to alleviate claimants’ burden 
of proof, a rebuttable presumption has been established that the overcharge has been passed on to 
indirect purchasers.   
The Directive establishes the following presumption:  
“The indirect purchaser shall be deemed to have proven that a passing-on to that indirect purchaser 
occurred where that indirect purchaser has shown that:  
(a) the defendant has committed an infringement of competition law;  
(b) the infringement of competition law has resulted in an overcharge for the direct purchaser of 
the defendant; and  
                                                 
71 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, 2008, p 66 
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(c) the indirect purchaser has purchased the goods or services that were the object of the 
infringement of competition law, or has purchased goods or services derived from or containing 
them.”  
This presumption is clearly meant to facilitate the burden put on indirect purchasers. Indeed, if it 
is a follow-on action, if a court has already ruled on the existence of the overcharge on the direct 
purchaser, and if the product is not the “purchased goods or services derived from or containing 
them”, then the presumption does a lot to facilitate indirect purchaser actions.72 However, indirect 
purchaser would still face considerable obstacles as the three cumulative conditions brought out in 
the previous sentence are frequently not fulfilled. Also, indirect purchasers would face further 
obstacles such as for example proving the size of its individual damage and the requirement of 
causality which will be further discussed in the following chapter.   
4. Issues faced in applying passing-on of overcharges 
This chapter brings out the main issues that will be likely faced by direct purchasers, indirect 
purchasers and the national courts when applying the relevant provisions of the Directive to the 
passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing. 
4.1. Issues faced by direct purchasers 
There are several obstacles to be faced by direct purchasers in case the national courts are going 
to easily accept the passing-on defence invoked by the infringer. Perhaps the biggest issue would 
be the disincentive to bring claims as allowing the passing-on defence would inevitably reduce the 
amount of compensation paid to the claimant and make litigation more complex and time-
consuming. Indeed, “a successful passing on defence will operate to reduce liability, and thus 
constitute an obstacle to private enforcement”.73 
Further, it has been argued that “A rebuttable presumption that price overcharges were fully passed 
on to end purchasers would reduce the total number of claims brought by direct customers”.74 This 
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purchasers and proving loss, 2014, p 8,9, available at http://www.uaces.org/documents/papers/1401/stirling.pdf  
73Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of 
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is due to the fact that it remains unclear how the presumption that price overcharge was fully 
passed on to end purchasers would be ignored in cases brought by direct purchasers. Therefore, 
this presumption is likely to have a negative impact on the effective private enforcement of 
competition law and would be inconsistent with the objective to facilitate damages actions.  
In addition, it might be the case that the infringer would successfully invoke the passing-on defence 
as a consequence of which a direct purchaser would fail to get compensated for its actual loss. 
Nevertheless, direct purchaser could still prove that it has suffered loss of profits. The Directive 
recognizes two types of losses, the actual loss and loss of profits – damnum emergens and lucrum 
cessans respectively. Article 12(3) of the Directive stipulates that “This Chapter shall be without 
prejudice to the right of an injured party to claim and obtain compensation for loss of profits due 
to a full or partial passing-on of the overcharge.”  
However, the concept of loss of profits is very much underdeveloped in the Directive. It has been 
argued that: 
“In order to reinvigorate this head of damage, the Commission could have for instance linked pass-
on with a rebuttable presumption on loss of profits – something that is economically conclusive. 
If the passing-on defence of an infringer is successful, this implies that it was possible to properly 
quantify the pass-on from the direct purchaser to the indirect purchaser. This typically also implies 
that there is a quantity effect.”75  
Thus, such rebuttable presumption would have made the litigation a lot more efficient and also 
ensured that the victims would be compensated.  
What is more, many national competition authorities as well as the European Commission itself 
are likely to highlight the consumer benefits that their actions will bring about. Consequently, 
oftentimes they will add a statement in their decision that the competition law infringement 
ultimately affected the end consumers as it was possible to pass on the overcharge. However, such 
                                                 
75 Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, Toward a European Directive on Damages Actions, 2014, Journal of Competition Law 
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statements would have a negative impact for the claimants who bring damages actions and are not 
the end consumers as it would indicate that only the end consumer is the one who suffered harm.76  
For example, in a damages actions claim in France following a decision by the European 
Commission, a French court denied claimant a compensation as the claimant could not prove that 
it was impossible to pass on the overcharge and because the Commission’s decision and press 
communication indicated that the direct purchasers could pass on the overcharge.77 The judgment 
explicitly brings out that the 5 December 2001 Commission’s press communication states that the 
final consumers suffered harm as they had to pay more for the product and would have paid less 
if there had not been any infringement.78 It is unclear, though, whether the Commission’s statement 
is a general opinion or did it actually mean that the end consumers were the only ones to suffer 
harm. However, as the Directive holds a view that the overcharge is generally passed on down the 
supply chain, such statements by the NCAs and the Commission would likely occur and mislead 
the courts.  
To conclude, the existence itself and a broad interpretation of the passing-on defence works as a 
disincentive for direct purchasers to bring damages actions which consequently makes private 
competition law enforcement less efficient and also contradicts with the objective of the Directive 
– to facilitate damages actions.  
4.2. Issues faced by indirect purchasers 
As for the issues faced by indirect purchasers, one of the main obstacles they face is proving of 
the existence and scope of the passing-on of overcharges. This is due to the fact that they are very 
remote from the infringement itself and the fact that it is extremely difficult for the end-user to 
analyze the scope of pass-on using a statistical study.79 “An inability to prove the existence as well 
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as the extent of the illegal passing-on of the overcharge implies that the end-consumer will not be 
compensated”. 80 
In order to alleviate indirect purchaser’s burden, the EU Council as well as the European Law 
Institute suggested a rebuttable presumption in favour of the indirect purchaser standing. The EU 
Council suggested a provision stating that: 
“Member States shall ensure that where an indirect purchaser claims compensation in relation to 
an infringement which led to an overcharge, a passing-on of overcharge having an impact on the 
price of the goods or services he purchased shall be deemed to have been proven, provided that 
these are the same goods or services that were subject to the infringement, or goods or services 
derived from or containing the goods or services that were the subject of the infringement”.81 
Similarly, the European Law Institute suggested a provision stipulating that:  
“Where an indirect purchaser claims compensation with regard to an infringement leading to 
overcharge, a passing-on of overcharge impacting the price of the goods or services purchased 
shall be deemed to have been proven, provided that these are the same goods or services that were 
subject to the infringement, or goods or services derived from or containing the goods or services 
that were the subject of the infringement”.82  
It should be pointed out that this presumption would have been the case only with follow-on 
actions. Indirect purchasers would have, thus, still faced considerable burden in stand-alone 
actions.  
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However, such presumption never made it to the final Directive. Instead, we can nevertheless find 
a rebuttable presumption in favour of indirect purchaser in Article 14 of the Directive, which 
according to some commentators “does not seem realistic”.83  
For instance, Article 14(2) states that the presumption in favour of indirect purchaser is conditional 
to the proving that the defendant has committed an infringement of competition law. However, 
should it not be a follow-on case, an indirect purchaser would not be in a suitable position to submit 
evidence needed to prove the infringement. The necessary evidence is oftentimes exclusively in 
the possession of the defendant or third parties and indirect purchasers might not be aware of such 
evidence.84 
Further, such presumption is said to be limited as it is only facilitating the burden of proof 
regarding the passing-on and its extent.85 Therefore, “indirect purchasers would still have to bear 
the burden to substantiate and prove a claim, especially the amount of their individual damage, as 
well as the lack of evidence regarding this”.86 Indirect purchasers would also need to prove the 
existence of the initial overcharge and the size of their damage. Thus, they would have to 
demonstrate to what extent the overcharge caused them harm. For example, “particularly where in 
the course of the production/distribution chain the overcharged good or service was used to 
produce other goods or services, the claimant would still have to indicate the degree to which the 
goods or services it purchased incorporate the defendant’s overcharged good or service, in order 
to show its harm”.87  
In addition, it has been argued that Manfredi allows for national causality rules to deny in some 
circumstances indirect purchaser standing. “It follows that any individual can claim compensation 
for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or 
                                                 
83 Erdem Büyüksagis, Standing and Passing-on in the New EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, 
SZW/RSDA 1/2015, p 20. Referring to European Law Institute, Statement of the European Law Institute on 
Collective Redress and Competition Damages Claims, 2014, p 80 
84 Ibid, p 20 
85 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, 2008, p 67 
86 Erdem Büyüksagis, Standing and Passing-on in the New EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, 
SZW/RSDA 1/2015, p 20-21 
87 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules, 2008, p 67 
32 
 
practice prohibited under Article 81 EC”.88 “Given that the Court emphasised the requirement of 
causality, the finding of the Court does not exclude national provisions or case law that lead to 
barring damages actions brought by certain indirect purchasers for reasons of remoteness”.89 Also, 
when establishing the causal link, “it is necessary to examine the existence of damage and the 
assessment of that damage in the light of the normal course of events and real probabilities, not 
theoretical ones.”90 However, oftentimes indirect purchasers would not be in a position to establish 
such causal link.  
Moreover, unfortunately the Directive does not specify nor give any instructions for Member 
States to modify their tort law rules on causality. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU create obligations and rights that must be respected. It has been argued 
that “harmonisation of certain conditions relating to remedies in actions for the enforcement of EU 
law is no more than a necessary consequence of the fact that the Treaty creates in one way or 
another obligations and rights for individuals and Member States” and is not, thus, conflicting with 
the principle of procedural and remedial autonomy of the Member States.91    
Nonetheless, the Directive highlights that those rules shall be consistent with the principles of 
effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, in theory, there should not be any national rules prohibiting 
standing for indirect purchasers for the reasons of remoteness and unforseeability. It is unlikely, 
though, that for example in a cartelized product case that has been processed into another product, 
it would be possible to prove the passing-on as there are numerous factors that influence the pricing 
at the downstream level. In such cases, the causality between the infringement and the passing-on 
can only rarely be established.92 
In addition, such scenario has been discreetly presented by the drafters of the Directive as well. By 
proposing a provision stipulating that “insofar as the overcharge has been passed on to persons at 
the next level of the supply chain for whom it is legally impossible to claim compensation for their 
harm, the defendant shall not be able to invoke the defence referred to in the preceding paragraph”, 
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they obviously accept that the national rules on causality can, in some circumstances, deprive an 
indirect purchaser of the right to claim damages. Again, a simple eradication of that provision does 
not eradicate the issue itself. The Directive should have stipulated the rules on causality 
requirements as well. As such, it would have ensured that indirect purchasers would not fail due 
to the requirements of causality since those requirements “play a predominant role”93 when 
bringing damages actions. Further, it would have also enhanced the efficiency objective of the 
Directive as the likely references to the ECJ regarding the compatibility of a national rule with the 
principles of effectiveness and efficiency would not be the case. 
To conclude, indirect purchasers will likely face many great obstacles when bringing damages 
claims such as proving the scope and extent of the overcharge passed on to them, the causal 
relationship between the infringement and harm suffered, proving the infringement itself in stand-
alone cases and their individual harm.  
4.3. Issues faced by the courts  
When compared to other kinds of civil actions, the courts are already facing very difficult tasks 
when it comes to damages actions in competition law cases – the judges will need to analyze 
complex economic issues such as defining the relevant market, whether the alleged conduct 
negatively impacts the market and the consumers, what is the size of the damage etc. Needless to 
say, those issues are oftentimes extremely sophisticated so that even the experts in the field of 
economics struggle with the right answers, let alone the judges who are supposed to be the experts 
in the field of law. In addition, the fact that most of the Member States do not have a specialist 
competition law tribunal or court does not facilitate the problem either.94  
Adding another task to the courts, letting the defendant use the passing-on defence, would 
excessively burden the courts and seriously undermine the damages actions litigation in general. 
As already stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Hanover Shoe case, the economic analysis and 
calculating the passing-on “would normally prove insurmountable”.95  
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Indeed, for example, it is generally accepted that a pass-on of the overcharges assessment should 
start with an assessment of competition on the relevant market – the more competitive the market, 
the more likely that the overcharge is passed on in its entirety. This is so due to the fact that on a 
competitive market, prices are comparative to the costs and if costs change, so do prices. However, 
the different methods to calculate the overcharge are oftentimes not accurate and can only be 
presumed. For example, “price-setting practices, such as cost-plus pricing, usually suggest higher 
rates of pass-on; price pointing suggests lower rates. Cost increases that are small relative to the 
price of the final product might be associated with full or zero pass-on, depending on the facts of 
the case.”96 In addition, cost-based analysis often fails to take into account the fact that the market 
might be oligopolistic and thus, the above-normal profits are not abnormal.97 Further, it may be 
the case that certain groups are not affected by the overcharge due to their bargaining power and 
consequently, there exist no correlation between prices between different groups of buyers. This 
might exclude the possibility to measure average prices and constitutes another obstacle to the 
assessment of overcharges.98 Also, it would be almost impossible to make sure, especially in cross-
border cases, how much of the overcharge has been absorbed by each distribution level.99  
These were only a fraction of examples that materially complicate the assessment and calculation 
of overcharges. At the end of the day, in most cases the calculation of the overcharge would be 
based on an empirical estimation. Getting the accurate data from all the relevant parties to the case 
would be almost impossible. Thus, it can be concluded that even today, the passing-on defence 
would amount to an “insurmountable task” for the courts to analyze and should not be easily 
allowed to be used by the defendant.   
Further, as the Directive does not specify the rules governing causality, it does not only cause 
issues for indirect purchasers but obviously likewise to the courts. Ultimately, it is up to the 
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national courts to make sure that the principle of effectiveness and efficiency are being respected 
and followed. It may lead to a likely scenario where national courts are obliged to turn to the ECJ 
for a reference for a preliminary ruling regarding the compatibility of a national provision 
governing the rules on causality and the principle of effectiveness and efficiency. Indeed, it has 
been argued that “It is to be expected that the requirement of a causal link will give rise to extensive 
litigation both as regards the question whether the national rules comply with the principle of 
effectiveness and as regards proof of the existence of a causal link”.100 Those likely scenarios 
would consequently make the litigation more time-consuming, costly and uncertain which is 
definitely not facilitating the effective EU private competition law enforcement.  
Also, it might be the case that establishing who the direct and indirect purchasers actually are 
remains speculative or impossible to make sure. This can be due to some very complex market 
structures and sophisticated supply chains consisting of many layers.101 An example of such issue 
can be illustrated by the U.S. case Warren General Hospital v Amgen.102 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals Third Circuit held that Warren General Hospital was not a direct purchaser as it obtained 
the products from a wholesaler and not from Amgen. The Court of Appeals found this regardless 
of the fact that Warren General Hospital concluded the contract directly with Amgen and 
communication regarding any issue with the products were held between Warren General Hospital 
and Amgen.103 Thus, it might be the case that a seemingly direct purchaser is nevertheless an 
indirect purchaser and vice versa.  
In conclusion, the courts will face many practical issues regarding the passing-on defence and 
indirect purchaser standing such as calculating the overcharge and its pass-on, rules on causality 
and distinguishing who the direct and indirect purchaser are. All this is negatively affecting 
efficient private competition law enforcement. Thus, the author is of the opinion that the courts 
should not easily grant the passing-on defence while granting a wide standing for indirect 
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purchasers. This would inevitably raise the doubts as for overcompensation which will be next 
analyzed in the following section. 
5. Likelihood of overcompensation and unjust enrichment by direct and 
indirect purchasers  
Many stakeholders have expressed their views following the launch of the Green Paper that not 
allowing the passing-on defence and granting indirect purchaser standing would lead to 
overcompensation and unjust enrichment of both direct and indirect purchasers. The proponents 
of the passing-on defence contend that the passing-on defence is essential as it would avoid a 
situation where a direct purchaser who passed on the overcharge would be compensated for the 
harm it did not suffer. In addition, the stakeholders contend that it would lead to a multiple liability 
of a defendant if a direct purchaser will get compensation for the harm it did not suffer and in 
addition to that, an indirect purchaser would also be able to claim damages for the harm it suffered 
as an end- or intermediary consumer.104 Based on the experience of the U.S. damages claims and 
the absence of an efficient collective redress mechanism in the EU, the author will argue that 
overcompensation of the claimant in the EU is unlikely. And thus, the EU should limit the use of 
the passing-on defence and should grant indirect purchasers compensation to the greatest possible 
extent.  
5.1. Experience of the U.S. 
Based on a study105 conducted by the director of the American Antitrust Institute, a professor and 
a former practicing lawyer Mr. Robert H Lande and Professor Joshua Davis, and data106 collected 
from all antitrust cases in the State of New York from years 2000-2008, and comparing it with the 
situation in the EU, overcompensation of claimants in damages actions in the EU is highly 
unlikely.107 
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First, it shall be noted that contrary to a general misconception that the competition law damages 
actions contain a large number of frivolous claims, are meritless and amount to extortion, most 
cases in the U.S. do have merit and contain an illegal conduct by the defendant. Indeed, 88% of 
the 60 cases that had been studied were at least partly founded.108  
Moreover, 47 cases out of 60 large U.S. cases the study analyzed were opt-out class actions that 
were also subject to contingency fees. It is argued that prohibiting contingency fees “severely 
restricts the ability of most consumer-plaintiffs to recover” as most consumers would not have the 
money to bring actions. Further, those 47 cases were recovered in the amount of $33.8-$35.8 
billion by private plaintiffs.109 Therefore, as the Directive does not provide for neither the opt-out 
class action nor contingency fees, most victims will remain uncompensated and overcompensation 
is again highly unlikely.  
In addition, based on the experience of the U.S., indirect purchasers are almost always 
undercompensated. Indirect purchasers face difficulties in bringing the necessary evidence and 
proving their individual damage. The study argues that “if the U.S. experience is a guide, the 
relatively modest payments that will be made to indirect victims won't cause the sum of payments 
to direct and indirect purchasers to exceed 100 percent of the overcharges”.110 In addition, the 
antitrust cases studied in the State of New York suggest that the rate at which indirect purchasers 
bring claims to the courts is de minimis.111 Thus, based on the statistics, the possibility of 
overcompensation is marginal and double liability of the defendant is almost always excluded.  
Further, perhaps the most persuasive argument is that even in the U.S. where treble damages are 
awarded, overcompensation is not likely. It has been argued that: 
“The U.S. ‘treble damages’ remedy usually yields settlements of less than 50 percent of actual 
damages. If this ratio were to apply to European private cases under the proposed Directive, 
European victims would be expected to recover on average significantly less than 50 percent of 
actual damages. Even in the cases where some victims additionally recover under the laws of 
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individual European nations, their total compensation is likely to be far less than the actual harm 
they suffered.”112  
There is absolutely nothing to indicate that overcompensation would be the case in the EU, it is 
very likely however, that the victims in the EU will remain considerably undercompensated. 
Also, another point to support the view that overcompensation would not be the case in the EU 
and that there would not be as much private litigation in the EU lies in the ratio between public 
and private enforcement. Private enforcement outweighs public enforcement in the U.S. in a 10:1 
ratio whereas in the EU, private litigation normally follows to a decision of a NCA or the 
Commission.113 As public enforcement relies heavily on leniency programs in the EU, potential 
private litigants may not wish to bring actions as they may realize that due to the protection of 
leniency applicants, they might not have access to the necessary evidence to support and prove 
their claims. 
Yet another interesting argument is that even in the U.S., regardless of the possible sanctions and 
obligation to pay compensation, collusion mostly in the form of a cartel “remains a rational 
business strategy”.114 The study showed that the U.S. cartel sanctions are only 9-21 per cent of 
what they should be in order to avoid cartelization. Thus, public and private sanctions combined 
are not leading to over-deterrence in the U.S. It would be highly unlikely that it would lead to over-
deterrence in the EU, especially considering the fact that overcompensation in the EU is even less 
likely than in the U.S and that the EU Commission is not involved in public sanctioning in most 
of the Article 101 and 102 cases.115   
The bottom line is that there are views that the U.S. private antitrust enforcement has not achieved 
a moderation in the enforcement system116 and has led to “overexpansion of the antitrust laws and 
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their increasing use to retard rather than promote competition”.117 However, these views are not 
supported by statistical data but rather encompass general statements.118 It should also be noted 
that the risk of overcompensation in the EU has not yet been studied119 and all presumptions that 
it would take place in the EU are speculative at their best.  
To conclude, based on the aforementioned arguments from the experience of the U.S. antitrust 
law, overcompensation of claimants in the EU is highly unlikely. To the contrary, most of the 
claimants in the EU will remain largely undercompensated or will not get compensated at all.  
5.2. Absence of an efficient collective redress mechanism in the EU 
The Green Paper found that for practical reasons, it is extremely hard and unlikely, if not 
impossible, for end consumers and purchasers to bring damages actions as their individual damage 
is oftentimes so small that the cost and efforts of damages claims would not outweigh the potential 
compensation received. In addition to protecting consumer interests, collective redress 
mechanisms could also be used to consolidate smaller claims that would save both time and money. 
To alleviate the issue, the Green Paper proposed that a solution could be found in introducing 
collective redress mechanisms.120  
Two options for collective redress mechanisms were thus proposed: 
 “A cause of action for consumer associations without depriving individual consumers of 
bringing an action. Consideration should be given to issues such as standing (a possible 
registration or authorisation system), the distribution of damages (whether damages go to 
the association itself or to its members), and the quantification of damages (damages 
awarded to the association could be calculated on the basis of the illegal gain of the 
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defendant, whereas damages awarded to the members are calculated on the basis of the 
individual damage suffered)” (Option 25); 
 “A special provision for collective action by groups of purchasers other than final 
consumers” (Option 26).121 
Following a public consultation period, many stakeholders opposed to the idea of collective redress 
in the EU. The main arguments being that it would be a financial burden to the society and not that 
surprisingly, the fact that infringers would potentially face multiple liability. Thus, yet again, the 
fear of multiple recoveries from infringers seems to be prevailing.  
However, the ones supporting some sort of collective redress mechanism brought out that 
collective redress is necessary “in order to reduce the difference between the costs of the action 
and the often small value of the damage individually suffered”. It could be concluded from the 
public consultations that some form of collective redress is supported by the majority, however it 
should be designed so that unmeritorious claims would not be possible.122 Why would 
unmeritorious claims avalanche after introducing a collective redress mechanism remains a 
mystery. To the contrary, for instance, the introduction of opt-out mechanisms in Portugal and the 
Netherlands is not reported to have led to excesses in damages claims.123 
The White Paper proposed for two solutions: 
 “Representative actions, which are brought by qualified entities, such as consumer 
associations, state bodies or trade associations, on behalf of identified or, in rather restricted 
cases, identifiable victims. These entities are either (i) officially designated in advance or 
(ii) certified on an ad hoc basis by a Member State for a particular antitrust infringement 
to bring an action on behalf of some or all of their members; and 
 Opt-in collective actions, in which victims expressly decide to combine their individual 
claims for harm they suffered into one single action”.124  
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However, recital 13 of the Directive specifically states that “this Directive should not require 
Member States to introduce collective redress mechanisms for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 
102 TFEU”. Instead, the Commission adopted ”Common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights 
granted under Union Law”.125 Paragraph 4 of which reads that “The Member States should 
designate representative entities to bring representative actions on the basis of clearly defined 
conditions of eligibility”. Unfortunately, this instrument is non-binding for Member States and it 
does not provide for an opt-out collective redress mechanism.  
The reason why no opt-out mechanisms were adopted is probably that opt-in mechanisms are 
“more similar to traditional litigation, and would therefore be more easily implemented at national 
level”.126 However, this argument is questionable as it has been argued that the “U.S. style” class 
action itself is a rather alien concept in the EU and thus not very traditional.127  
In addition, it has been brought out that introducing an opt-out collective redress mechanism would 
limit claimants’ freedom to informed decisions and it would conflict with the objective of 
collective redress – distributing compensations to the victims – as the parties are not identified.128 
The latter argument is, according to some, “rather bizarre”129 as it is commonly known that a notice 
procedure precedes the action and there is a possibility for victims to be identified.    
But all in all, the opt-out collective redress mechanism already does exist in some Member States 
(for example the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal) and thus, it is unfair to exclude the 
opt-out mechanism as “it is as much part of this European experience as any other model”.130 Dr. 
Andreangeli sharply points out that it is time for a reality check as opt-out class actions are not the 
enemy of fairness in the European legal traditions and that it is time to rethink the European 
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established wisdom as regards class certification in competition and other mass torts. Indeed, 
rejecting the opt-out mechanism would result in inconsistency with the trends and developments 
of several Member States to introduce opt-out mechanisms.131 
Further, even in a highly unlikely situation where all Member States decide to act by the 
recommendation and introduce the collective opt-in class action mechanism, overcompensation 
would still not be the case. For example, 47 out of 60 large U.S private litigation cases that were 
studied were opt-out collective actions. Opt-in class action, however, “typically recover damages 
for only a tiny percentage of victims”.132  
Thus, it could be contended that the lack of a binding opt-out class action mechanism in the EU 
will make overcompensation of the claimants simply not possible. Quite the opposite, it is highly 
likely that most victims will not be compensated at all. In order to alleviate this issue and make 
sure that at least the victims that have the will to bring actions, opt-out collective action mechanism 
should be introduced. “Indeed, there is every reason to give the instruments to European private 
market participants which will enable them to act effectively against market power that harms 
European consumers.”133  
*** 
In conclusion to this section, it can be contend that according to the aforementioned arguments, 
namely the U.S. experience and the lack of an attractive collective redress mechanism in the EU, 
overcompensation of claimants cannot prevail over undercompensation. Also, “it must be borne 
in mind that a trade-off exists between a higher chance of full compensation and a risk of 
overcompensation, but that the latter risk is offset by the risk of undercompensation resulting from 
the lack of action or from the absence of appropriate substantive and procedural rules governing 
damages actions”.134 Thus, it is only appropriate to broaden the standing for indirect purchasers 
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and limit the use of the passing-on defence while also introducing an EU-wide opt-out collective 
redress mechanism.  
6. Conclusion 
This thesis argued that the passing-on of overcharges chapter in the Directive does not serve one 
of the main objectives of the Directive – facilitating competition law damages actions in the EU. 
It also found that many of the arguments brought by the proponents of allowing the passing-on 
defence are based on misconceptions. Most of them are based on the fear of overcompensation. 
Overcompensating, however, as suggested in this thesis, remains highly unlikely in damages 
actions, and even if it does occur in a rare case scenario, its risk is offset by the risk of 
undercompensation.  
It has been demonstrated that easily allowing the use of the passing-on defence for the defendants 
would seriously undermine the efficiency of damages actions. It would mainly serve as a 
disincentive for direct purchasers as it would inevitably reduce the compensation paid to them, but 
it would also excessively complicate the claims and unnecessary lengthen the proceedings. 
Further, the Directive grants wide standing for indirect purchasers. However, it has been 
entertainingly stated that “Merely granting standing to indirect purchasers according to the general 
rules of liability does not create enough of an incentive for them to bring a damages claim, just 
like the simple right to marry does not create enough of an incentive to get married”.135 Though, 
the presumption in favour of indirect purchasers in the Directive does ease the burden of proof on 
indirect purchasers in rare situations where the three preconditions (it is a follow-on action, a court 
has already ruled on the existence of the overcharge on the direct purchaser, and the product is not 
the “purchased goods or services derived from or containing them”) are fulfilled. However, 
compensating indirect purchasers would still be minimal as first and foremost, indirect purchasers 
would often find themselves in an impossible position to present evidence and prove their 
individual damage and the link between the infringement and the harm they suffered. 
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The thesis concluded in the last chapter that even if passing-on defence is widely accepted, 
overcompensation is unlikely. Likewise, even the broadest indirect purchaser standing would not 
result in overcompensation as there are no attractive collective redress mechanisms available under 
the EU law. As such, the impact of the passing-on defence and indirect purchaser standing should 
be rethought. 
As a consequence, the thesis suggests that in order to avoid undercompensation and not 
compensating at all, passing-on defence should not be widely accepted and indirect purchasers 
should be granted compensation in the greatest possible way while at the same time, the EU should 
consider introducing an opt-out collective redress mechanism. At the end of the day, the EU should 
put more emphasis on protecting the victims of the infringements instead of protecting the 
infringers who have caused harm to the individuals and the society in general. “Justice is a core 
value of the EU Member States societies and victims of competition law have been waiting too 
long for that justice. They are still waiting.”136 They are looking forward to an attractive collective 
redress mechanism, just compensation for any victim and limitations on the passing-on defence.   
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